

**Making it to the News
Interest Groups in the Danish Media¹**

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1. Introduction

Media attention is a precious resource for political actors. In present-day political systems much interaction between political actors centers on the media (Mazzoleni & Schultz, 1999). Parties and political candidates are keen to have their stories propagated by reporters, ministers employ spin doctors, and government organizations operate public relations offices. For interest groups, a prominent presence in the media is also a sign of success. Mediatization of politics has made the media arena more important for pursuing political influence (Binderkrantz, 2005; Kriesi, Tresch, & Jochum, 2007). Also, members of interest groups expect to see their representatives in the news – and new members may be attracted by media appearance. Appearing in the media is important for the dual group goals of achieving political success and securing organizational membership (Ainsworth & Sened, 1993).

Every day a number of interest groups are successful in gaining media attention. Groups voice the concerns of their members, they react to political initiatives and are asked by reporters to comment on various news stories. Other groups are less successful in making it to the news. While group leaders would probably prefer unhindered access to the media, the reality is that media attention is scarce. The number of interest groups and other political actors seeking access to newspapers and electronic media far exceeds what can be reported upon. In the selection process, where some stories and groups gain attention and others are ignored, group resources and priorities affect the input of groups to the news production, while factors related to the functioning of the media are important in determining the output in terms of interest group access to the media. This chapter examines relations between group input to the media in the shape of media-directed tactics and the output defined as group appearances in news stories. While previous research has either studied the strategies of groups or their presence in the media (Beyers, 2004; Binderkrantz, 2012), we here combine these research questions.

Patterns of media appearance have wider implications than those related to individual interest groups. Media presence is an important indicator of a powerful position in the media arena. In line with the mediatization of politics, decision makers have become increasingly sensitive to the news (Kepplinger, 2002). A prominent media presence provides an opportunity to affect or even shape the political agenda and influence the content of ongoing debates as well as political decisions. It is crucial to investigate the distribution of media attention to different groups. Is media attention a privilege of a few large interest groups or is it more dispersed among groups? Which types of groups are most successful in making it to

the news? Do different media outlets make room for different group types in their news stories? And how do group resources affect their presence in the media?

We address these questions step-wise. Lowery and Gray have launched the idea of an influence production process as a general approach to the study of group influence (Lowery & Gray, 2004). Here we follow groups as they mobilize for influence, adopt tactics aimed at the news media and finally appear in news stories. Our empirical focus is Danish national interest groups. We combine data from a survey among all national interest groups with mappings of group appearances in two major national newspapers. This allows us to compare the input of groups in terms of media-directed tactics with output in the shape of media appearances.

2. Media attention: From group strategy to media presence

2.1 Diversity in group representation

Media attention is a valued asset for interest group leaders. They engage in media-directed tactics to ensure that the groups' views are heard, and many groups systematically track their media appearances. A high number of media appearances is an indicator of an influential position in the media arena. From a democratic perspective this is of interest because an important characteristic of democracy is that all members of the relevant polity have equal and effective opportunities to make their views known to others (Dahl, 1998). In democratic practices this puts interest groups at center stage since groups constitute a main channel for the expression of diverse viewpoints in public debates. Increasing mediatization of politics makes the media arena particularly relevant for an analysis of different groups' options for making their voices heard (Mazzoleni & Schultz, 1999). In other words: by studying the media access of interest groups it is possible to shed light on a crucial aspect of democratic processes.

Diversity in group representation – or its flipside concept, bias – has continually been a major theme in the group literature (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003: 117; Schattschneider, 1975 [1969]; K. L. Schlozman, 2012). Most attention has focused on the composition of the overall population of groups or groups that lobby decision makers, while fewer studies have analyzed group appearances in the media (see Binderkrantz, 2012; Danielian & Page, 1994; Thrall, 2006). Empirically, diversity in group representation is a difficult concept because there is no clear way to assess what an unbiased system would look like. Here, we focus on comparing the representation of different types of groups in two

national newspapers. We follow groups through the influence production process (Lowery & Gray, 2004) asking whether there is more or less diversity in the groups that are mobilized for action towards the media arena than in the groups that actually appear in the news – and if so what factors can account for group access to the media.

We define interest groups as membership organizations working to obtain political influence. Group members can be individuals, firms, governmental institutions or other interest groups (cf. Jordan, Halpin, & Maloney, 2004). In order to address the issue of diversity in representation, interest groups have been divided into the following categories: 1) trade unions, 2) business groups, 3) groups of institutions and authorities, 4) professional groups, 5) hobby groups, 6) identity groups and 7) public interest groups.

The first four types are all related to production in the private or public sector. The two first groups are almost indispensable: A classic discussion thus concerns the balance between business and labor, which are of special interest in a European context because of the tradition of involving labor market groups in corporatist arrangements (Christiansen, 2012; Molina & Rhodes, 2002). A third group type is producers and providers of public service. Local authorities in most countries have established interest groups, and schools, universities, museums and other institutions are organized in regional and/or national associations. These are categorized as ‘groups of institutions and authorities’. Finally, professional groups represent the many different professions represented on the labor market. They are distinguished from trade unions because they do not negotiate work -related terms and conditions.

The latter three types of groups may all be seen as citizen groups, but we find it crucial to distinguish between those that represent specific groups of citizens, i.e. hobby groups and identity groups, and those working for broader causes, i.e. public interest groups. The latter are distinguished from other groups because they seek goods, the achievement of which will not materially benefit their members (Berry, 1977: 7). Identity groups encompass for example groups representing demographic or minority groups. Hobby groups have no relation to the labor market and their members are united by a common hobby. We have also included religious groups in the ‘hobby group’ category because these are not very numerous.

2.2 The media: a prominent group target

Any understanding of interest group access to the media needs to take into account both the groups’ incentives for seeking media attention and the selection mechanisms that determine which news stories and groups the media report on. Making it to the news can be seen as a

step-wise process, and different factors are likely to be important at different stages. Lowery and Gray's (2004) idea of an influence production process is useful. It calls attention to the different stages from group mobilization, over interest groups' strategic choices and finally to political influence. In the present context this involves focusing both on: (1) factors involved in mobilizing groups to seek media attention and (2) factors related to the media and their news selection.

The discussion of groups' use of media-directed activities has centered on whether media strategies are a 'weapon of the weak' used by groups that are excluded from decision making processes or rather one among an arsenal of weapons used by a variety of groups (Beyers, 2004; Wolfsfeld, 1984). By now, it is well documented that media-directed activities are prominent in the political tool box of most interest groups. Most groups frequently use tactics such as issuing press releases and talking to journalists and they evaluate these activities as important (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Beyers, 2004; Binderkrantz, 2005; Kriesi et al., 2007). It has also been shown that different types of influence strategies are complementary. The more actively groups lobby decision makers, the more active they are in approaching the media (Binderkrantz, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2007). This pattern supports Beyers' (2004) persistence hypothesis according to which an intensive media strategy is simply one among many instruments used by groups to attain political influence.

Even though media-directed tactics is a general tool of influence, different groups do not have equal incentives to prioritize the media in their political work. Notably, public interest groups have a special interest in this channel of communication. They draw their membership from the population at large and have insufficient ways of communicating with members (Dunleavy, 1991). Further, they often work for causes that appeal to broad segments of the population and see the media as a particularly attractive arena for placing these causes high on the agenda (Binderkrantz & Krøyer, 2012). Previous research has demonstrated that public interest groups do in fact use a media-directed strategy more intensively than other types of groups (Binderkrantz, 2008).

One thing is incentives; another is having the resources to pursue effective influence strategies. There are huge differences in the resources possessed by interest groups, and resources matter both for the capacity to monitor the political system and to engage in media-directed activities. Media strategies are expected to be more intensively used by resourceful groups.

2.3 Mechanisms of selection

Media access is the result of a resource exchange (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) between actors interested in appearing in the media and reporters deciding which stories to report on and what sources to include in such stories. Depending on what groups have to offer journalists – or what the media literature terms their news value – interest groups will be more or less successful in making it to the news.

Central in news values theory is that routine decisions about media coverage shape the patterns of actor presence in the media. According to news values theory media selection is based on factors – e.g. status, power and relevance – that make some events and actors newsworthy and therefore increase their chances of making it to the news (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Bennett (1990) argues that reporters ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in the news according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate. Cook (1998) discusses how officials are generally seen as more reliable sources than other actors. The effect is a systematic bias in the pattern of actor appearance favoring public officials (Bennett, 1990: 106; Cook, 1998; Thrall, 2006: 408). A parallel argument can be made for interest groups, and the decisive factor is whether groups enjoy privileged access to decision making. Such access can provide groups with inherent news value similar to that of public officials. According to Thrall, the same groups that dominate the inside game of politics can thus be expected to be dominant in the media arena (Thrall, 2006: 408).

Another perspective is the inherent news values of the stories and angles pursued by interest groups. Media appeal is important and it varies according to whether groups pursue issues of narrow or broad social relevance (Binderkrantz & Krøyer, 2012). Wolfsfeld (2011: 72) argues that the media are above all dedicated to telling a good story, and stories involving drama and conflict are, for example, more likely to appear in the news. According to news value theory, personalization also affects the likelihood that stories are reported (Galtung & Ruge, 1965), which gives groups with a good supply of personalized case stories a competitive advantage. These elements of news value theory can be expected to benefit public interest groups and identity groups representing specific constituencies such as patients or the elderly.

While the discussion above refers to general news values, more media outlet-specific patterns may also be at play. Previous research has demonstrated differing patterns of group appearance in different newspapers (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2010). In Denmark as well as in other European countries, there has historically been parallelism between newspapers and the political system in the sense that individual papers had ties to specific parties. Over

time, these ties have loosened and papers have gained increasing independence (Hjarvard, 2008). However, newspapers still have different guidelines and traditions for political coverage.

Among the major Danish daily newspapers, there is a clear division between left-leaning and right-leaning papers. For example *Politiken* calls itself an independent social-liberal paper and is in general considered to be left leaning, while *Jyllands-Posten* is a self-described independent liberal paper (Hjarvard, 2008: 80-81). These differences may lead different papers to give disproportionate attention to specific parties and to the interest groups that are traditionally aligned with these parties (Allern & Bale, 2012). Specifically, it may be expected that left-leaning papers are more likely to provide trade unions with a political platform, while right-leaning papers report more on business groups. For other types of groups it is difficult to establish clear expectations.

3. Research design

The research design combines information about the mobilized group population, groups' media strategies and group access to the media. The data sets are linked by assigning each interest group a unique identification number, which allows us to analyze linkages between different stages in the influence production process as well as how factors at the group level affect media strategies and access. We rely on a survey among all Danish national interest groups and a mapping of group access to two national newspapers. We use measures of: 1) group type and resources, 2) privileged access to decision making processes, 3) media-directed tactics, and 4) group appearances in the media.

An intriguing issue in all studies of interest groups is to identify the relevant population (Berkhout & Lowery, 2008). There is no way to know exactly how many groups exist and it may be particularly hard to identify groups that unsuccessfully attempt to gain access. To identify interest group populations, researchers have utilized different approaches that partly reflect national traditions and the availability of directories or other relevant lists of interest groups (Halpin, Baxter, & MacLeod, 2012). In Denmark there is no general directory of groups, so scholars have relied on searches in a wide array of sources. The result is a list of groups that has been continuously updated over the years (Christiansen, 2012).

The present study took the existing list of interest groups as point of departure and internet searches were carried out to check if groups still existed. Also, searches of subsection-specific registers – for example of business groups – were conducted and new groups added to the list as identified in these registers. Finally, all groups identified in the

media sources discussed below as well as in sources related to the parliamentary arena and the administrative arena were added. The result is a register of the group population that includes every major nationwide political interest group in the Danish political system as well as a very encompassing range of less significant groups (for more information see: www.interarena.dk). All groups identified were coded by the authors into the group types specified above (with a reliability test resulting in a Cohen's kappa of 0.906).

The final list of groups included 2,543 groups and a survey was conducted among these to gather information about interest group characteristics and the use of media strategies. A crucial step was to identify whether groups were in fact politically active. The first set of survey questions was designed to distinguish between politically active groups and other groups. 1,645 groups – corresponding to 65 percent – responded to the survey, and the 1,109 that reported to be politically active are used as reference population of interest groups. From the survey we use information about group resources, privileged access to decision making processes, and media-directed tactics. We use two measures of group resources: one based on answers to a question about general group income and one based on the number of employees working with political issues. Both have been logarithmically transformed to obtain linearity. The measure of privileged access is based on five questions asking about how often the group is asked to comment on proposals for bills and regulations, to participate in public committees, is consulted about the composition and mandate for public committees and generally contacted by public servants. We also include both a measure of a general media strategy and a more confrontational mobilization strategy in the analysis. The first includes questions about how often groups write opinion pieces, contact reporters and arrange press briefings/issue press statements. The second incorporates questions about legal and illegal direct action and organizing petitions.

The indicator of media access is presence in the news media. Our study encompasses two national newspapers with different political leanings – *Politiken* and *Jyllands-Posten*. The coding period ranges from July 1 2009 to June 30 2010; all articles in the first section and the business section (only relevant for *Jyllands-Posten*) of the two papers were read and articles mentioning interest groups were registered. Articles that were clearly non-political were left out of the analysis. We also omitted appearances where a group was framed negatively as these cannot meaningfully be seen as constituting group access to the media arena. A total of 3,672 relevant media appearances were registered.

To address the diversity in the different settings: the full population, the active population and the groups with media access we use the Herfindal-Hirschman index.

Originally developed to measure market concentration the index is commonly used to measure the concentration of units on a variable. In our case the index measures the dispersion on different group types in the relevant sets of groups.²

In the multivariate analyses of media access we use a negative binomial regression model because our data are count data with overdispersion. Alternatively, a zero-inflated model could have been used (because there is a large number of zero observations on the dependent variable) but there is no strong theoretical foundation for using such a model specification. Prior to the analysis all independent variables have been recoded to range from 0-1.

4. Analyzing interest groups in the media

Can we confirm previous findings about the widespread use of media tactics and how important such tactics are for different types of groups? Table 1 presents information about the full population of groups identified and the politically active groups. It also includes the distribution of groups that report different tactics to be important to some or a large degree. We include two conventional media tactics – contacting reporters and arranging press briefings and issuing press statements – alongside two tactics of more confrontational character – legal direct action, demonstrations and happenings as well as civil disobedience and illegal direct action.

2. The index varies between $1/N$ and 1, where N is the number of values on the variable. With 7 values on the variable used in tables 1, 2 and 3, the minimum value in our case is .14 and the maximum value 1.00.

Table 1: Patterns of media input. Column percentages

	Group population		Media tactics ¹			
	All groups	Politically active groups	Contacting reporters	Press briefings and press statements	Legal direct action, demonstrations and happenings	Civil disobedience and illegal direct action
Business groups	27.4	25.3	24.3	26.5	2.0	5.4
Trade unions	10.4	14.2	16.1	15.5	25.9	13.5
Groups of institutions and authorities	4.4	6.3	7.2	7.4	3.0	2.7
Professional groups	16.0	11.5	8.3	6.3	7.6	5.4
Hobby groups	14.4	12.7	10.4	10.9	8.6	13.5
Identity groups	14.3	14.4	15.7	15.8	19.3	10.8
Public interest groups	13.0	15.6	18.0	17.5	33.5	48.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	2,543	1,109	760	633	197	37
Concentration ²	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.23	0.29

Notes: ¹ The media tactics report answers to the question: “How important are the following when the group seeks political influence?” The columns include groups answering: ‘to a large degree’ or ‘to some degree’. ² The Herfindal-Hirschman index.

The information in table 1 allows us to compare the composition of the different sets of groups in regard to group type. A first observation is that of the 1,109 groups responding to our survey 760 and 633 find the two conventional media tactics important. In comparison only 197 see legal direct action etc. as important and a mere 37 groups report that civil disobedience and illegal direct action are important in their political work. It is also notable that the index of concentration is almost the same for the full group population, the politically active population and the sets of groups using mainstream media tactics. On the other hand, confrontational tactics display much higher levels of concentration indicating that these are primarily used by some group types.

Turning to specific group types, business groups constitute about 27 percent of all groups but their share in the population of active groups is a little lower. This reflects that many small business groups are only politically active through larger umbrella groups. When it comes to media-directed tactics, business groups evaluate conventional tactics such as contacting reporters and issuing press statements as important, but they largely refrain from direct action. Trade unions are more likely to be politically active and utilize a broader range of tactics. Most notably, they constitute almost 26 percent of the groups that view legal direct action, demonstrations and happenings to be important.

Groups that represent local authorities and institutions make up about 4 percent of all groups identified. These groups are very likely to be politically active as their share of the active population is 6.3. Like business groups they are heavily engaged in conventional media tactics and have a lower tendency to find direct action important.


Professional groups and hobby groups exhibit rather similar patterns of activity. They are less likely than other types of groups to be politically active (their share of the general group population is higher than their share in the active population). For almost all tactics, they are also less likely than other groups to be among the groups that find the tactic important. Many of these groups can be seen as peripheral participants in the political process. Their activity mostly concentrates on non-political work but occasionally they mobilize politically (Jordan et al., 2004).

Identity groups and public interest groups both constitute higher shares in the sets of groups that evaluate tactics as important, than they do in the full population and the politically active population. For identity groups the exception from this pattern is that they are not very keen on using illegal direct action. Public interest groups, on the other hand, make up almost half of the groups that evaluate these tactics as important and a third of all groups that evaluate legal direct action, demonstrations and happenings as important.

In conclusion, the utilization of conventional media strategies corresponds rather well to the composition of the overall population of politically active groups. Hobby groups and associations of professionals are somewhat underrepresented in the set of groups targeting the media, while trade unions, institutional groups, identity groups and public interest groups are a little overrepresented. Unconventional media tactics are not evaluated as important by most group types, but public interest groups – and to some extent trade unions and identity groups – are more prone to use both legal and illegal forms of direct action.

One thing is to engage in media-directed tactics; another is to attract media attention. As illustrated by figure 1 the distribution of media attention is highly skewed. The figure shows the accumulated number of groups receiving different shares of media attention. A total of 482 groups were identified in the news stories selected for analyses but while some appeared daily or almost daily, many other groups appeared only once. About 25 unique groups received almost half of all media attention and about 50 groups accounted for two-thirds of the attention.

Figure 1: Distribution of group appearances, percentages of all media appearances



While the distribution of attention across unique groups tells us that media attention is highly skewed, it does not tell us anything about the type of groups appearing. Table 2 displays the pattern of media access across different group types. It includes information both on the distribution of all 482 groups (unique groups) found in at least one news article, on the distribution of the full number of interest group appearances, and on front page appearances. As a standard of comparison, the table repeats the distribution of politically active groups from table 1.

Table 2: Patterns of media access: unique groups and access, column percentages

	Politically active groups	Access to media		
		Unique groups	Total access	Front page access
Business groups	25.3	26.8	31.4	17.0
Trade unions	14.2	17.6	29.8	27.0
Groups of institutions and authorities	6.3	5.8	12.0	17.7
Professional groups	11.5	7.9	1.6	3.0
Hobby groups	12.7	7.7	2.4	2.3
Identity groups	14.4	15.8	9.1	13.6
Public interest groups	15.6	18.5	13.7	19.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1,109	482	3,672	610
Concentration ¹	0.16	0.18	0.23	0.19

Note: Numbers in bold indicate overrepresentation compared to the population of politically active groups ¹ The Herfindal-Hirschman index.

The index of concentration clearly shows that media attention is more concentrated than the distribution of the group population across different types. The HHI is 0.16 for the group population, 0.18 for the groups found at least once in the media and 0.23 for the distribution of all appearances. The level of diversity thus decreases as we move from media input to output. Interestingly, front page access is less concentrated than general access. Although it may be seen as the most privileged form of media attention, there is more diversity here than in the full newspaper.

To some degree the table corresponds with the notion that media access is disproportionately given to the actors who are also important political insider players. Compared to their share in the politically active group population business groups, trade unions, and institutional groups are overrepresented on most measures of media access. Interestingly, this is least marked for business groups. They constitute about a quarter of the total population of politically active groups and their share of all media appearances is 31.4, but only 17 per cent of front page appearances. For comparison trade unions appear in almost 30 percent of the news stories and 27 percent of front page stories despite a population share of only 14.2 percent. Most impressively, the share of front page appearances for groups for authorities and institutions is almost three times what their population share would predict, and they have about twice as many total media appearances. The lion's share of this attention is occupied by the two large organizations representing local and regional authorities, Local Government Denmark and Danish Regions.

Professional groups and hobby groups are not well represented in the media. Although they constitute about 12 per cent of politically active groups and about 8 per cent of all groups identified in the media, their share of all group appearances is 1.6 and 2.4. This may partly reflect that these groups are not particularly active, even if many of them, as shown above, do find media tactics important.

Identity groups and public interest groups are rather likely to appear in the media, but only rarely, and their total share of media attention is not impressive – especially considering that they are prone to evaluate media tactics as important. Public interest groups fare somewhat better than identity groups especially in terms of front page attention where every fifth group that appears is a public interest group.

Until now the two newspapers have been analyzed together, but they are actually quite different. *Jyllands-Posten* is a center-right-leaning paper and *Politiken* is center-left leaning (Hjarvard, 2008). How this affects the type of interest groups appearing in the papers

is revealed in Table 3, which shows the distribution of all appearances and front page appearances in the two papers.

Table 3: Media outlet and group appearances. Column percentages

	Jyllands-Posten		Politiken	
	Total access	Front page	Total access	Front page
Business groups	39.6	18.2	20.6	16.3
Trade unions	26.1	22.5	34.7	29.9
Groups of institutions and authorities	10.9	23.3	13.5	14.2
Professional groups	1.4	2.5	1.8	3.2
Hobby groups	2.5	1.7	2.2	2.7
Identity groups	9.4	14.8	8.6	12.8
Public interest groups	10.1	16.9	18.5	20.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	2,096	236	1,576	374
Concentration ¹	0.26	0.19	0.22	0.20

Note: ¹ The Herfindal-Hirschman index.

There is a clear contrast between the two papers. *Jyllands-Posten* makes room for more stories about business groups and identity groups, while trade unions and public interest groups are more likely to be mentioned in *Politiken*. As expected, historical patterns of parallelism between media outlets, parties and interest groups are reflected in interest groups reported on in these two papers. This seems to affect not only the share of articles about trade unions and business groups but also other types of groups. The difference in stories about public interest groups is particularly notable. Many of these groups work for causes – for example the rights of immigrants or environmental issues – that align best with left-wing parties and this may explain why they have better access to *Politiken*.

To what degree do the patterns reflect effects of group type per se and to what degree are other factors important? We now test the factors affecting general level of media appearances and level of appearance in each paper. The results of this multivariate analysis are reported in Table 4. The analyses are conducted in two steps. The first model includes dummy variables for group type (with business groups as reference category) and variables measuring group resources. In the second step, measures of a conventional media strategy and a more confrontational mobilization strategy are included alongside a measure of having a privileged position in public decision making processes.

Table 4: Negative binomial regression with media access as dependent variables

		Total media access		Access to Jyllands-Posten		Access to Politiken	
		Coefficients (standard errors)		Coefficients (standard errors)		Coefficients (standard errors)	
Group type	Business groups	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
	Trade unions	0.401 (0.215)	0.588** (0.220)	0.027 (0.235)	0.275 (0.246)	0.823*** (0.242)	0.949*** (0.251)
	Groups of institutions and authorities	0.249 (0.301)	0.225 (0.291)	-0.274 (0.345)	-0.246 (0.338)	0.660* (0.330)	0.625 (0.326)
	Professional groups	-0.031 (0.303)	0.251 (0.303)	-0.208 (0.354)	0.061 (0.358)	0.294 (0.393)	0.585 (0.397)
	Identity groups	0.611** (0.219)	0.447* (0.226)	0.369 (0.238)	0.295 (0.248)	0.974*** (0.259)	0.787** (0.273)
	Hobby groups	-0.941*** (0.287)	-0.594* (0.291)	-1.317*** (0.342)	-0.911** (0.346)	-0.543 (0.349)	-0.297 (0.357)
	Public interest groups	0.507* (0.227)	0.394 (0.250)	-0.200 (0.262)	-0.214 (0.296)	1.090*** (0.252)	0.934*** (0.276)
Re-source	Group income	3.010*** (0.587)	2.476*** (0.595)	3.076*** (0.745)	2.642*** (0.745)	3.511*** (0.815)	2.878*** (0.795)
	Political employees	6.176*** (0.513)	3.830*** (0.542)	6.437*** (0.592)	4.165*** (0.629)	5.721*** (0.577)	3.622*** (0.599)
Context	Media strategy		2.564*** (0.380)		2.273*** (0.425)		2.513*** (0.425)
	Mobilization strategy		-0.371 (0.667)		-0.661 (0.787)		0.073 (0.728)
	Privileged position		0.930** (0.340)		1.053** (0.382)		0.747 (0.386)
	Constant	-3.270*** (0.406)	-4.310*** (0.427)	-3.697*** (0.509)	-4.729*** (0.530)	-4.678*** (0.553)	-5.609*** (0.563)
	Pseudo R ²	0.148	0.173	0.164	0.186	0.167	0.193
	N	1,025	1,011	1,025	1,011	1,025	1,011

Note: Levels of significance: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, *** = 0.001. Significant effects are marked in bold.

With respect to group type, identity groups and public interest groups are generally more likely and hobby groups less likely than business groups to have a high overall media appearance. When we control for group strategy and position, hobby groups remain less media exposed, while identity groups and trade unions gain more attention than business groups. The separate analyses of the two papers reveal that group type is not particularly important for appearing in *Jyllands-Posten* where the only effect is that hobby groups are less present than business groups. In *Politiken*, trade unions, identity groups, and public interest groups are all more likely to appear than business groups (in the first stage this also goes for institutional groups). The effect of group type is thus very different in the two papers.

The two newspapers are more similar when it comes to group resources. The number of political employees and group income positively affect access to both papers. Engaging in a conventional media strategy also has a positive effect on appearing in the news, while the effect of a confrontational mobilization strategy is negative but insignificant. This may indicate that these tactics are indeed a ‘weapon of the weak’ used by groups that find it difficult to get their message through to decision makers and the press (Wolfsfeld, 1984). Lastly groups occupying a privileged position are significantly more likely than others to appear in *Jyllands-Posten* and in the measure of overall media access, but the effect is not significant on appearances in *Politiken*.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed how interest groups make it to the news. Some of the results confirm findings from previous research: Media tactics are utilized by a wide variety of groups. The value added of our approach stems from linking information about the politically active group population and their preferences for media-directed tactics to data on actual group access to the media. Four findings are particularly noteworthy:

First, media access is highly unevenly distributed. A few groups appear daily, while most groups rarely or never make it to the news. A notable finding is that only 25 unique interest groups get about half of all media attention. The picture may be different in local and regional media, but strikingly few interest groups dominate the national newspaper media’s coverage.

Second, the diversity in respect to group type decreases as we move our attention from the groups seeking media access to those appearing in the papers, i.e. from media input to media access. This supports the general reasoning that selection mechanisms at different stages make a difference. When reporters choose which groups to report on some group types – particularly institutional groups, trade unions and business groups – are systematically more likely to be chosen than others. And as the multivariate analysis reveals this is not only related to group type but also to differences in possession of resources.

Third, different papers report on different types of groups. Trade unions and public interest groups have a better chance of appearing in the center-left-leaning *Politiken*, while business groups are more represented in the center-right-leaning *Jyllands-Posten*. Despite a general loosening of relations between political parties, newspapers and interest groups (Allern & Bale, 2012), political parallelism is still present in nationwide newspapers.

Fourth, resources count. Across all the different measures of media access the one type of variable with the most effect is group resources. Resources enable groups to engage in effective media strategies and also signal political importance to reporters. In effect, groups with a high income and many employees working with political matters are more likely to make it to the news.

The 'influence production model' behind the structure of our analysis has proved fruitful. Influence on political decisions is produced in a stepwise process. In relation to the media, groups have to decide to what extent and with what effort they will use a media-directed strategy. Intentions are not the same as access, however. Groups have to produce news and react on news in ways that reporters and newspaper editors find interesting. Access is not gained until reporters and editors have decided to publish a story related to an interest group. We have shown that there is no simple one-to-one relation between media strategies and media access. Still, media access does not equal influence. There may even be a very long way from media access to political output. How media appearance may be converted into political influence is yet another part of the influence production model.

6. References

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